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Abstract 
This research aims to investigate the relationship 
between the internal and external criteria of evaluation 
and the bonus of board of directors in listed companies 
of Tehran Stock Exchange. In this regard, all of the 
listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange which pre-
sented the financial statements (balance sheet, loss and 
gain bill) and the required information between 2007 
and 2012 were investigated. Totally, 96 companies of 
different industries were selected to test the hypotheses, 
regression analysis and pane data were used. To test the 
significance of model and significance of coefficients, 
F and t statistics were used, respectively; also to test the 
correlation of model, Durbin - Watson was used. The 
results showed that there is a significant relationship be-
tween the amount of sales and stock return and reward 
of board of directors in Tehran Stock Exchange but 
there is no significant relationship between the oppor-
tunities of investment and reward of board of directors.
Keywords: Representation theory, reward of 
board of directors, evaluation criteria of perfor-
mance, opportunities of investment
Introduction
Between the 1980’s and the 1990’s, many interna-
tional companies permitted the managers to use their 
rights for buying up stocks with basic cost in order to 
create relationship between the equity of rights of head 
managers and their performance and in case that their 
performance lead to development of company , the 
managers could share the profits of stockholders. For 
one decade, this approach was popular because Stock 
Exchange was developed for several years and made 
huge profits for the manager and investors. But falling 
the stock markets in 2002, big companies concluded 
that this system is not favorable (Anand et al, 2003). We 
can infer that there are different approaches for giving 
reward to the managers. Thus, this question has been 
always proposed that which method and how much re-
ward is suitable for the managers to make the manag-
ers motivated and make them try to gain the outcome. 
What is obvious is that the investment emphasizes on 
increasing wealth of investor and stockholders so we 
should consider that efficiency of managers of econom-
ic agents is important and we can increase wealth fast 
by encouraging the managers. What is proposed here 
is that what evaluation method is favorable to motivate 
the managers to increase the profit of stockholders, on 
the other hand, the managerial aiming at increasing the 
sale of stock return or the investment opportunity or the 
commercial criteria can create motivations which are 
inconsistent with wealth of stockholders. Representa-
tion theory states that there is a strong conflict between 
the interests of stockholders and management and the 
managers are going to maximizing their interests by 
means of stockholders of companies which these in-
terests are in conflict with the interests of stockhold-
ers (Fong et al 2002). To control the representatives of 
managers in companies and ensure the responsibility 
fulfillment and their responding to the stock companies 
and support the rights of stockholders, many approach-
es should be considered. One of these approaches is 
mechanism of paying reward to the managers. 
Fama (1980) believes that managers are a part of 
labor market and gain reward based on the individual 
and organizational performance and their performance 
principled by labor market. So, in case of inconsistency 
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of reward and performance, the manager who receives 
less than his performance will leave the company. So 
considering the reward schemes of managers directs 
toward the interest of stockholders because despite this 
fact, the value of company and manger decreases.
Jensen and Macling (1976) analyzed the con-
flict between the stockholders and managers and 
showed that to decrease the cost of representation, 
the reward of managers should be relative to the 
stockholders. Rewarding based on the values is a 
sound method to reach the aim.
Jensen and Murphy (1990) investigated the re-
lationship between paying reward to managers and 
their performance in big companies in the 1970’s. 
They inferred that paying reward to the managers 
is not a stimulus for their performance; they also 
stated that in stock companies, the reward of senior 
managers is independent of their performance. 
Duru (1998) studied the relationship between the 
value added of the market and the reward of man-
ager with economic profit and also investigated the 
effects of investment opportunity on the relationship 
between the managers’ reword and economic profit. 
Analyses suggested the positive relationship between 
the value added of the market and economic profit 
which increases during a period of time. 
Elyan et al. (2001) investigated the schemes of 
reward given by executives and its effect on perfor-
mance of 73 companies listed in New Zealand Stock 
Exchange during 1994 and 1998. The results of re-
search showed that the company size and commer-
cial risk are the effective factors of the amount of re-
ward. Also, neither the reward nor the motivational 
schemes of reward is not related with the perfor-
mance of company, but there is a significant relation-
ship between Tubin Q ratio and stocks in the hand of 
managers but when the rate of asset return and rate of 
equity return are used as the basic evaluation of per-
formance, this relationship is not significant. 
Hartzell (2002) in his research investigated the 
relationship between the reward of managers and 
investment. He showed that even if after controlling 
the corporate size, industry type and investment op-
portunities and performance, there is a positive rela-
tionship between the organizational ownership and 
amount of payment based on the performance and 
negative relationship between the organizational 
ownership and amount of reward. 
Evaluating the performance of company based on 
the accounting criteria, Kato and Kubo (2004) found 
that cash reward of Japanese managers is sensitive to 
the performance of company. They concluded that the 
processes of market performance in this country plays 
minor role in the reward of the Japanese managers.
Jang et al (2006) investigated the effect of owner-
ship structure on the relationship between the reward 
of managers and corporate performance. This study 
was performed on the corporates in New Zealand in 
2001. The findings of research in 2005 suggested that 
in companies with centralized ownership structure, 
the relationship between the reward of managers and 
corporate performance is negative and in companies 
which do not have centralized ownership structure, 
the relationship between the reward of managers and 
corporate performance is positive. 
Namazi and Seirani (2005) investigated the re-
lationship between the reward given by managers in 
Iranian companies with accounting profit, growth 
of profit and growth of value added in market using 
the representation theory and also investigated the 
important structures to determine the reward given 
by the managers. They found that the longer the du-
ration of contract and its stability is, the more the 
value of company will be and the contracts of pres-
ent rewards depend on the accounting profit. In this 
regard, the following hypotheses are suggested:
The primary hypothesis: There is a positive re-
lationship between the evaluation criteria of corpo-
rate performance and reward of managers in listed 
companies of Tehran Stock Exchange.
Secondary hypothesis 1: There is a positive re-
lationship between the amount of sales as a criterion 
of performance evaluation and reward of board of 
managers.
Secondary hypothesis 2: There is a positive re-
lationship between Investment opportunities (IOS) 
and reward of board of managers.
Secondary hypothesis 3: There is positive rela-
tionship between the annual stock return as a cri-
terion of performance evaluation of companies and 
reward of board of managers
Methods and models
To test the hypotheses of this research, regression 
model and analysis of panel data were used. To test the 
significance of model and significance of coefficients, 
F and t statistics were used, respectively; also to test 
the correlation of model, Durbin - Watson and to in-
vestigate the normality of distribution of variables Kol-
mogorov – Smirnov test were used and each variable in 
this research was tested regarding the error level of 5%. 
To test the hypotheses of research, the following model 
taken from research by Balsam et al (2010) was used:
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In above equation:
Dependent variable:
lnComp
i;t
: normal logarithm of reward of board 
of directors
Independent variables:
In sales 
i:t
: normal logarithm of corporate selling
RET
i;t
 : Annual stock return
IOS
i;t
: investment opportunities which equals 
summing the market value of equity with book value 
of debts divided by book value of assets 
Materials and Methods
Statistical sample and sampling method
Statistical samples of this research included all 
of the listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. 
lnComp
i;t
 = α
0
 + β
1
 ln Sales
i;t
+ β
2
ROA
i;t
+ β
3
RET
i;t
+ β
4
IOS
i;t
 + β
5
ROE
i;t 
+ε
i;t
To determine the samples of research, companies 
from the statistical samples were selected:
Their financial year must end on 29th of Esfand 
(March)
They must attend in Exchange from 2007 to 2012.
Their financial year must not change between 
2007 and 2012. 
They should not be included in the group of fi-
nancial intermediation (banks, organizations and 
investments)
The required information of companies should 
be available. 
Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables
Variables Min Max Mean SD Variance
ROE - 6.412 3.241 .443 .674 .472
ROA -.051 1.692 .451 .184 .0357
ln Sales 4.276 7.667 5.565 .554 .309
RET .120 .799 .456 .353 .272
IOS -.927 2.279 0.299 .532 .322
lnComp 3.433 6.203 4.567 .501 .253
In table 1, the mean of variable of return of eq-
uity (ROE) is 0.443 and its maximum and minimum 
equals 3.24 and -6.412, respectively which is consis-
tent with the similar researches about the equity re-
turn. Minimum amount of normal logarithm for In 
Sales equals 4.27 and maximum is 7.66 and its Mean 
is 5.56 which means that the sampling companies in 
this research has 5.56 sales. The mean of IOS equals 
0.29 which means that in sampling companies, eq-
uity return is 29% and it minimum and maximum 
equals -0.92 and 2.27, respectively.
For reward of board of directors, the normal 
logarithm was used, its mean equals 4.56, its maxi-
mum mean equals 6.20 and minimum mean equals 
3.43 and according to the researches performed in 
country, the corporate size is average. 
Table 2 shows the statistics and Sig of Kol-
mogorov-Smirnov for the variables of this research.
Table 2: Statistics and Sig of Kolmogorov-Smirnov
ROE ROA ln Sales RET IOS lnComp
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 4.643 2.891 3.456 4.876 6.987 5.873
Sig .072 .055 .065 .112 .327 .076
As shown in table 2, the sig of Kolmogorov-
Smirnov for all of the variables is more than 
5%. So, these data are normally distributed 
and normalization of distribution of variables 
was done by using software and statistical tech-
niques. 
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Testing research hypotheses
To test the hypotheses of this research, regres-
sion and analysis of panel data were used.
The results of this test suggest that F equals 
13.64 and P value equals 0.07. So, the hypothesis of 
integrated model is accepted. In other words, there 
are individual and mass effects and the method of 
Pooled data for estimating model should be used. 
Table 3: Test of panel or Pooled detection
Test Statistics p-value Result
F 65/12 67/0
Pooled
Qi-square 56/31 087/0
Investigation of inconsistency of variance
To investigate the inconsistency of variance 
ARCH LM and Whit test were used in this research 
the results of test of inconsistency of variance ARCH 
LM and White is as follows:
Table 4: Results of test of inconsistency of 
variance ARCH LM
Description Statistics value Prob
F-statistic 134.011 0.000
Obs*R-squared 123.145 0.004
Table 5: Results of test of inconsistency of 
variance White
Description Statistics value Prob
F-statistic 5. 3254 0.0033
Obs*R-squared 25.859 0.0010
Scaled explained SS 58.1895 0.0051
The Prob of models equals zero. As the test 
is not statistically significant , the hypothesis of 
consistency is rejected and inconsistency of vari-
ance is accepted. In this research, to solve the 
problem of inconsistency of variance, the data 
were weighted. 
Testing the significance of fixed effects method
To test the significance of fixes effects method, 
both F statistics and Hausman tests were used. 
Table 6: Result of Test of cross-section fixed 
effects
Description Statistics value Prob
Cross-section F 7.5671 0.0345
Table 7: Hausman test
Description Statistics value df prob
 Cross-section random 14.8765 7 0.0121
As in both tests , for regression model , the Prob 
is less than 5 % , we use the fixed effects method in 
this model. 
Investigation of autocorrelation (independence of 
errors)
To test the lack of autocorrelation of the model, 
Durbin-Watson was used. This statistics equals 2.44 
based on the findings of tables of 9. If this statistics 
value is between 1.5 and 2.5, H0, the lack of cor-
relation between the residuals will be accepted and 
otherwise H0 will be rejected, so we can accept that 
there is correlation between the residuals. Accord-
ing to the statistics, we can declare that the autocor-
relation of residuals is accepted. 
Investigation of the linear relationship between 
the dependent and independent variables
To test the linear relationship between the de-
pendent and independent variables, F fisher was 
used and as shown in Tables 8, Sig of F test is less 
than 5 % (0.0011) so according to this table, the lin-
ear relationship between the dependent and inde-
pendent variables is accepted.
Table 8: F test to evaluate the linear relationship
Description Statistics Prob
F-statistic 42.35 0.0011
As shown in table 9, the estimated coefficient for 
variables of In Sale equals 0.020 and regarding that 
significance of this coefficient equals 0.017 and this 
scale is less than the error which suggests the sig-
nificance of this coefficient with regard to 5% error 
level and there is significant relationship between In 
Sales and reward of board of directors with regard to 
95% CI. So the first secondary hypothesis is accept-
ed. Also, the results of this study showed that there is 
a significant relationship between the annual stock 
return (RET) and reward of board of directors (In-
Comp) because the RET equals 0.047 and Sig col-
umn in table shows that this coefficient is significant 
with regard to 5% error and its Sig equals 0.0003 
which is less than 5%. So the second secondary hy-
pothesis is accepted. The results of this study sug-
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Table 9: Results of combined regression analysis
lnCompi;t = α0 + β1 ln Salesi;t+ β2ROAi;t+ β3RETi;t+ β4IOSi;t + β5ROEi;t +εi;t
Variables Coefficients Standard Error Statistics Sig
ROE 1.297964 4.418957 0.293726 0.0292
ROA .207431 0.798896 2.763104 0.0061
ln Sales .02064 5.93272 0.648319 0.0173
RET .04765 4.418957 1.985 .0003
IOS .13909 0.768896 35.490 .2253
Constant .03412 10.56327 5.158 .0001
Determined coefficient 0.381124 F statistics 42.35728
Balance Determined coefficient 0.034994 Sig 0.001142
Regression standard error 62.55277 Durbin-Watson 2.448656
gest that the third secondary hypothesis was rejected 
which means that there is no significant relationship 
between the Investment opportunities and reward 
of board of directors because the coefficient of this 
variable is estimated to be 0.034 and its Sig equals 
0.225 and less than 5% error , it suggest lack of sig-
nificance of this coefficient in this study and should 
be excluded. Regarding that two of three hypotheses 
were accepted, thus the primary hypothesis of this 
research was accepted. Determined coefficient of 
38% suggests that 38 of changes in dependent vari-
ables are determined by independent variables.
Investigation of the first secondary hypothesis: There 
is a positive relationship between the amount of sales as 
the evaluation criteria of corporate performance and 
reward of board of managers. To evaluate the above 
hypothesis in the companies listed in Tehran Stock 
Exchange , model 1 was used. The results showed that 
this hypothesis was accepted because the estimated 
coefficient for variable of In Sale equals 0.020 and re-
garding that its Sig equals 0.017 and this scale is less 
that error level , this suggest the significance of this co-
efficient in error level of 5 % and there is significant 
relationship between In Sale and InComp with regard 
to 95% CI, so according to the results of this study , the 
first secondary hypothesis is accepted. 
Investigation of the second secondary hypothesis: 
there is significant relationship between the investment 
opportunities and reward of board of directors. The 
results of this study suggest that there is no significant 
relationship between the investment opportunities and 
reward of board of directors because the estimated 
coefficient for the variable if IOS equals 0.034 which 
its Sig is 0.225 and more than 5% error level and this 
means lack of significance of this variable. So, this hy-
pothesis is rejected which is consistent with the results 
of study of Hartzell (2002) and inconsistent with the 
results of study by Elayan (20011) and Duru (1998).
Investigation of the third secondary hypothesis: There 
is a significant relationship between the annual stock re-
turn as a criterion of performance evaluation and reward 
of board of directors. To evaluate the above hypothesis in 
the companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange , model 
1 was used. The results of this study suggest that this 
hypothesis was accepted in companies listed in Tehran 
Stock Exchange because the estimated coefficient for 
variable of RET equals 0.047 and regarding that its Sig 
equals 0.0003 and this scale is less that 5% error level , 
this suggest the significance of this coefficient in error 
level of 5 % , so according to the results of this study , the 
third secondary hypothesis is accepted.
Investigation of the primary hypothesis: There is a 
positive relationship between the evaluation criteria of 
corporate performance and reward of managers in listed 
companies of Tehran Stock Exchange. The results of 
this study suggest that there is a positive relationship 
between the evaluation criteria of corporate perfor-
mance and reward of managers in listed companies 
of Tehran Stock Exchange because two other hy-
potheses which evaluate the relationship between the 
evaluation criteria of corporate performance were ac-
cepted, so it is concluded that the first hypothesis is 
accepted and they are consistent with the results of 
research by Elayan (2001) , Namazi and Seiri (2005) 
and inconsistent with the results of study by Jenson 
and Murphy (1990) and Kato and Kubo (2004).
Table 10 shows the results of test of research hy-
potheses 
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Suggestions 
Regarding the results of the first secondary hypothe-
sis showing the relationship between the amount of sales 
of companies as the evaluation criteria of corporate per-
formance and reward of board of managers and its ac-
ceptance , it is suggested that the companies increase the 
reward of managers by increasing their sales and using 
the opportunities of investment to increase the reward 
of managers and persuade the managers to increase the 
efficiency of the company and thus the values.
Regarding the results of the second secondary hy-
pothesis showing the lack of relationship between in-
vestment opportunities as the evaluation criteria of cor-
porate performance and reward of board of managers 
and it rejection, we can infer that companies have differ-
ent life expectancy and mangers make profits by recog-
nizing the opportunities of investment in different sec-
tions , by this way, the benefits of shareholders increases 
which is convincing to the managers to be efficient.
Regarding the results of third hypothesis about 
the significant relationship between the annual stock 
return as a criterion of performance evaluation and re-
ward of board of directors and its acceptance, it is sug-
gested to make the companies profitable and increase 
the value of companies with respect to the important 
factors of return and flexibility of companies against 
the unexpected events , and this can be a stimulus for 
persuading the managers to increase their reward.
Regarding the results of the main hypothesis 
showing the relationship between evaluation criteria 
of corporate performance and reward of managers 
and its acceptance, we can infer that if the rewards 
are efficient the cash funds will be excluded from the 
company and these expenses are those which have 
the economic benefits. It is essential to consider that 
with regard to the economic, industry and political 
conditions of companies selecting one of the reward 
Table 10: Summary of the results of test of research hypotheses
No. Hypothesis Result 
Main hypothesis
There is a positive relationship between the evaluation criteria of corporate perfor-
mance and reward of managers in listed companies of Tehran Stock Exchange.
Accepted 
Secondary 1
There is a positive relationship between amount of sales of companies as the 
evaluation criteria of corporate performance and reward of board of managers.
Accepted
Secondary 2
There is no significant relationship between investment opportunities and 
reward of board of managers.
Rejected 
Secondary 3
There is a significant relationship between the annual stock return as a crite-
rion of performance evaluation and reward of board of directors.
Accepted 
schemes (short or long term) is absolutely effective 
in paying the reward. This issue causes a positive 
motivation and sense of responsibility in managers.
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